ized;[1] the supplies of provisions and ammunition were inadequate;[2] and although there were a good many fresh troops, yet the army as a whole was not in a state to accomplish anything by a *coup de main.* On the other hand, while the loss of the battle was a terrible surprise and disappointment for the Northern people, it caused no wavering in their determination to prosecute the war. The members of the Congress of the United States were subjected to perhaps as severe a strain on their courage and confidence as it is possible to imagine, for not only was the battle lost, but crowds of panic-stricken Union soldiers, in a state of utter demoralization, poured through the streets of the Capital. Nevertheless, on the very day after the battle, the House of Representatives voted for the enlistment of 500,000 volunteers. There was no mutinous talk anywhere; no one spoke of changing the form of government; no one whispered of asking the President to resign. The disaster was borne by the Government and by the people in a thoroughly manly spirit; the only permanent effects of it were to intensify the determination of the nation to sue-

[1] Johnston even says : " Our army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat." I B & L., 252. Beauregard *(Rfan-assas,* 125) repudiates this statement, and calls attention

to the fact that there were some 15,000 men, who had taken no part in the battle. But this is an exaggeration. Jones' brigade, which had met with such a rough experience near McLean's Ford, certainly ought not to be counted among these. Early (r R & F., 380) says that " on the night following the battle . , . the greater part of the troops that had been engaged in the battle were in a great state of confusion." *Cf.* Barnard's Report **on** the Defences of Washington, 10.

[2] Johnston's *Narrative*, 64. Early, however, does not admit that the deficiency of provisions was a real difficulty. I R, & F., 301.